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Abstract
The excesses of the historic US housing cycle of the 2000s were concentrated in the
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada.
Even controlling for leading explanations of this housing cycle, these Sand State MSAs
had more than double the mortgage originations, defaults and price fluctuations as
other MSAs. We show that these excesses can be explained by Sand State MSAs
having an abnormally low supply of publicly traded firms headquartered there relative
to total income. Households in these MSAs are more likely to purchase investment
homes nearby rather than stocks, thereby amplifying the housing cycle there.
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1. Introduction
A defining feature of the US housing cycle of the 2000s, which contributed greatly to the
Great Financial Crisis and Recession, is that its excesses were concentrated in the states of
Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada. Because these states are not contiguously located
but share an abundance of beaches or deserts, housing market analysts have labeled them
as the Sand States. MSAs in Sand States had more than double the mortgage originations
and defaults over the period of 2000-2006 and significantly larger home price appreciation
and subsequent crash compared to other MSAs (see, e.g., Olesiuk and Kalser (2009)).
Three main explanations have been widely discussed to explain this recent US hous-
ing cycle. The first involves the easing of lending standards for low income or subprime
households, especially those living in low income growth areas (Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys
et al. (2009), Palmer (2014)). The second suggests the importance of differences in housing
supply inelasticities; the difficulty of building homes due to land or zoning issues in some
areas might have amplified the housing price volatility (Glaeser et al. (2008)).1 The third
is irrational exuberance: a rise in home prices perhaps initially brought on by fundamentals
was over-extrapolated (Shiller (2005), Glaeser et al. (2013)).
But none of these explanations can easily account for the Sand States. For instance, we
find emprically that MSAs with low income growth during the 1990s and MSAs with low
housing supply elasticities had bigger housing cycle excesses, consistent with the importance
of subprime lending and the difficulty of building homes. But in a multiple regression model,
these factors do not explain much of the Sand State effect. Similarly, other fundamental
factors such as population growth in certain MSAs in the 1990s, which might lead to over-
extrapolation, also cannot rationalize the excesses of the Sand States.
It is difficult to get a full grip of the causes of the historic US housing cycle of the
2000s without understanding what drove these excesses in the Sand States. A key fact that
1The rationale is that in low housing supply elasticity MSAs, supply could not quickly adjust to rising
demand and so prices had to. In contrast, in high housing supply elasticity MSAs, price responses were more
muted as many more homes were built.
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motivates our analysis is that households’ investments, be it stocks or non-owner occupied
homes, are locally biased. Driven by familiarity or other informational frictions, households
do not diversify but rather hold concentrated positions in stocks headquartered within 60
miles of where they live (see, e.g., French and Poterba (1991), Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001), Huberman (2001)).
This local bias is even more stark when it comes to non-owner occupied homes bought for
investment. In an annual National Association of Realtors (NAR) national survey of home
purchases, households characterize their investment home purchases in a similar way to how
they describe their purchases of stocks. Investment homes are bought to generate rental
income and typically face higher interest rates and more stringent collateral requirements
than either primary residences or vacation homes because banks view them as speculative
investments akin to stocks. Panel A of Table 1 reports from that survey the distribution of
the distances of the second home purchases from the primary residence of the buyer. The
median distance of the investment home from the buyers’ primary residence in 2005 was 10
miles. In contrast, the median distance of vacation homes was 220 miles.2 These numbers
are very stable across the many years over which the surveys were conducted.
In light of these local biases, we propose an explanation of the Sand States involving
the local investment opportunity sets of investors. Our analysis is particularly interested
in the supply of publicly available firms in an MSA, measured as the book equity of firms
headquartered in an MSA (total BOOK VALUE) relative to the total income of that MSA
(a RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE variable which we construct from a regression of total BOOK
VALUE on total income across MSAs).3 Sand State MSAs have on average low RESIDUAL
2Note that a strong local bias of investment homes is not inconsistent with the well-known findings in
Chinco and Mayer (2012) that out-of-town buyers drove real estate markets like Phoenix and Las Vegas.
Out-of-town buyers need not be buying investment homes and might be moving to these cities instead. Their
study examines price implications and do not have household portfolio data. The fractions of out-of-town
buyers are in any event typically a small fraction of total purchases.
3Our measure generalizes Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008)’s RATIO of BOOK VALUE to total income at
the state level. They show that RATIO is inversely related to the price-to-book of companies in that state.
That is, states with fewer companies have higher prices for their stocks due to an only-game-in-town effect.
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BOOK VALUE, meaning a low supply of equities relative to their income.4
We hypothesize that households in these MSAs with few local stocks headquartered there
are more likely to buy investment homes. We call this an only-game-in-town effect. There
are a number of possible reasons for this effect. The lack of supply can lead to higher
prices for local stocks (Hong et al. (2008)) and cause households to shift to local real estate.
Another reason might be that investors living in MSAs with few firm headquarters might not
have the same financial literacy or culture (Guiso et al. (2009)) or pay as much attention to
stock trading (Barber and Odean (2008)) as those living in MSAs with many. Our estimates
capture the totality of such mechanisms. Our goal is not to separate out these mechanisms.
We only want to show that households living in such MSAs have a higher propensity to make
real estate investments as opposed to investing in stocks. Because if this is the case, then
we expect that any given national factor that moves the housing market, be it easy lending
standards or aggregate optimism, gets magnified in these MSAs as the households there buy
a greater number of investment homes, causing mortgage originations and home prices then
to be more cyclical.
The role of investment homes in driving the Sand States phenomenon is an ex ante
plausible one. According to the same National Association of Realtors (NAR) Home Buyers
Survey, investment homes represented on average about 22% of the residential sales market
nationally or around one million homes annually between 2003 and 2013. Beyond being a
sizeable part of the real estate market, and as can be seen in Panel B of Table 1, sales of
these homes was correlated with the recent housing cycle of 2002-2007. In 2003, primary
residences accounted for 67% of the market, vacation properties 12% and investment homes
22%. During the peak year of 2005, investment homes rose to 28% of the market while
primary residences dropped to 60%.
We show that the RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE variable can account for a significant
4These values are measured in the 1990s, similar to our measures of income growth and population growth,
because we want to explain future mortgage originations and price movements with these pre-determined
variables.
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fraction of the excesses of the Sand States in multiple regressions through this investment
home channel. First, it can explain around 34% of the excess total mortgage originations in
the Sand States. Second, consistent with our hypothesis, this is largely due to the ability of
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE to explain mortgage originations of investment homes. Third,
it can account for about 11% of mortgage defaults and the excess home price fluctuations,
both the rise and subsequent crash.
These regressions include the largest 277 MSAs and are population weighted. However, a
large fraction of these MSAs have population around 100 thousand people, while large MSAs
might arguably be of more interest. When we focus just on large MSAs with a population
greater than or equal to 750 thousand people, which is 65 MSAs in total, we get even stronger
results. Our RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE variable can explain virtually all of the Sand States
effect—i.e. nearly all the excesses in mortgage originations, defaults and price fluctuations.
We then bring to bear new data to test the key mechanism behind our hypothesis: that
households living in low RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE MSAs have a higher propensity to buy
investment homes. We use data on household investment portfolios from the Federal Reserve
Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF samples a cross-section of roughly
5,000 to 6,000 households once every few years. The primary strength of the SCF is its
sampling of the right tail of the wealth distribution, which is typically missed in most other
surveys. We use the 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010 waves. We can calculate for each
SCF household the value of its investment homes and vacation homes as a fraction of its total
assets as well as its investments in stocks as a fraction of total assets (% INVESTMENT
REAL ESTATE, % VACATION HOMES, and % DIRECTLY-HELD STOCKS). We also
know the MSA, zip-code and county where the household lives and also have a host of
demographic information about the households.
To begin with, we consider how the usual household demographic factors affect investment
home and stock ownership. First, we find as expected that real estate investment homes and
stocks as a fraction of total assets are both rising in household wealth and income. Second,
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we find that households living in high average FICO (prime) zip codes, all else equal, own
fewer investment homes and more stocks than counterparts in low average FICO (subprime)
zip codes. To a lesser degree, white households, all else equal, also own less investment homes
and more stocks than non-white households.
Controlling for these demographic factors, we find, consistent with our only-game-in-town
hypothesis, that households living in MSAs where there are few stocks headquartered own
more investment homes and less stocks compared to other households. The mean percent of
household assets in investment real estate is around 3% and the mean percent in directly held
stocks is 2%. A one standard deviation increase in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE decreases
the percentage of assets held by households in investment real estate by about 27% relative
to this mean. It increases the percentage of total assets held in stocks by about 33% of its
mean.
One of the main concerns of this empirical analysis is that MSAs with few local firms
might simply have more low FICO type households or non-white households who prefer
homes to stocks. To rule out this alternative explanation, we use a difference-in-differences
strategy. Because there are different types of zip codes (low versus high FICO) within an
MSA, we can include Year × MSA Effects in our panel regressions and interact RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE with whether the household belongs to a high FICO zip code. That is,
we attempt to measure our only-game-in-town effect by looking at the difference in the
behaviors of households living in highest FICO (average score 721) versus lowest FICO zip
codes (average score 621) within the same MSA. We then expect that in low RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE MSAs households in high FICO zip codes will not tilt away from investment
homes as much compared to households in low FICO zip codes. That is, in MSAs with few
local firms, the behavior of households in low and high FICO zip codes ought to be more
similar than in MSAs with many local firms.
We indeed find that the portfolios of households, even high FICO households who on
average have a preference for stocks as opposed to investment homes, are tilted toward
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investment homes in MSAs with few local firms, consistent with our only-game-in-town
effect. Our regression estimates suggest that a one standard deviation decline in RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE in a MSA is enough to offset the average level difference in the propensity
of low FICO households to hold more investment real estate than high FICO households.
These findings emphasizing the key role of investment homes in the housing cycle are
reminiscent of several interesting studies of the recent housing cycle (see, e.g., Chinco and
Mayer (2012), Li and Gao (2013), and Haughwout et al. (2011)). These papers show that
there was significant variation in non-owner occupied home purchases across US Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and that those MSAs with the highest fraction of investment
home transactions experienced the biggest boom and bust patterns. Our paper provides a
systematic rationale for why this was the case.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We first examine in Section 2 the relationship between the
Sand State excesses and our only-game-in-town variables. Having established the relevance
of these factors, we then turn to the SCF data in Section 3 to study the mechanism behind
our variables. We conclude in Section 4. Additional robustness checks and discussions are
in an Internet Appendix.
2. Sand State Excesses and Local Supply of Equities
We begin by relating the excesses of the Sand State MSAs to the local supply of firms
headquartered there.
2.1. MSA Panel Data
To start, we construct a panel data set of annual observations on the conditions of the
housing market in MSAs from 2000 to 2010. From the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA), we collect estimates of the yearly housing price appreciation of homes within a
MSA. We gather yearly changes in various measures of mortgage origination amounts and
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default rates within a MSA from data of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).5 The
MSA supply elasticity calculated by Saiz (2010) is appended to this panel.
We have complete information on 277 MSAs over our time period. Panel A of Table 2
shows the summary statistics of these data. We break up the statistics into two periods:
the housing bubble period of 2000 to 2006 and the crash period from 2007 to 2010. Not
surprisingly, we find on average that there were substantial increases in housing prices and
mortgage origination across most MSAs in the bubble period, and those increases turn around
again in most MSAs in the crash period.
The data necessary to measure the relative supply of local stocks in a MSA similar to
Hong et al. (2008) are added to this panel. We use information from COMPUSTAT to
calculate the total book value of firms headquartered in a MSA and the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) for the total income in a MSA. We also collect measures of changes in the
economic conditions of MSAs during the 1990s, before our analysis. From Census sources,
we measure the percentage change in population in a MSA between 1990 and 2000. Again
using information from the BEA, we calculate the percentage change in total income during
the same period.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the summary statistics of a subsample of the 65 largest MSAs
in our sample: those with an average population in the sample period of at least 750,000.
For much of our analysis, we will examine the sensitivity of our results when we limit our
sample to bigger MSAs to make sure our results are not being driven by small cities. The
summary statistics of the subsample are very similar to the entire data set.
2.2. Measures of Local Stock Supply
In the spirit of Hong et al. (2008), we want to measure the differences across MSAs in the
availability of local stocks. Cities with a large total book value of firms normalized by the
5We concentrate on two measures of mortgage origination. The first is the percentage change in total
mortgage origination in a MSA. The second is the percentage change in second home mortgage origination.
For the default rate, we measure the ratio of the number of Notice of Defaults from 2007 to 2010 to the
number of mortgage originations from 2000 to 2006 in a MSA.
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cities’ total income are considered to have a high supply of local stocks; cities with a low
total book value relative to total income have a low supply.
For each MSA in our sample, we measure their average total book value of firms and
the average total income from 1996 to 2000. We then regress the log average total book
of a MSA on its log average total income from 1996 to 2000. The results of this regression
are presented in column (1) of Panel A Table 3. Not surprisingly, there is a strong positive
relationship between a city’s total firm book value and income. We use the residual of this
regression as a measure of the relative supply of local firms in a MSA. In other words, MSAs
with high local firm book value that cannot be explained by total income are considered
high local supply MSAs. We call this a MSA’s RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE.
Because we are not certain what the functional form of the regression of total book value
on total income should be, we also try two other specifications. We try adding a log Total
Income square term to the original specification, and we also add a cube term. The results of
those regressions are presented in columns (2) and (3) in Panel A of Table 3. Adding these
additional terms to the regression specification does not change the residual much. Panel
B of Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the three residuals. The correlations are very
high. In the rest of our analysis, we use the MSA RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE using the
regression that includes the square term.6
We first show that MSAs in Sand States on average have low RESIDUAL BOOK VAL-
UEs. Figure 1 shows the estimated relationship between log Total Book Value and log Total
Income for the 277 MSAs in our sample. Around that fitted line, we add the actual data
points of each of the MSAs. We highlight the MSAs that are in the Sand States. Over 60%
of Sand State MSAs are located below the fitted line, indicating that they have a low supply
of local stocks compared to other MSAs.7
We show the relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and whether the MSA is
6Not surprisingly given the high correlation of the different residuals, our results are almost identical
when we use the residuals from the other specifications.
7Table A1 lists the RESIDUAL BOOK VALUEs of our large MSA sample. The MSAs in Sand States
are highlighted.
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in a Sand State more formally in Table 4. We regress a MSAs RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
on a dummy variable for the MSA being in a Sand State. Column (1) shows the results of
this model. The coefficient on the Sand State dummy is negative and statistically different
from zero (t-statistic = -4.0). The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that being a MSA
located in a Sand State lowers a MSA’s RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE by 1.14. Given that the
standard deviation in our sample of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is 1.0, this means that Sand
State MSAs have on average a lower local stock supply that is 1.14/1.4=81% of a standard
deviation of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE.
We present the results in column (2) of a similar regression, except that now we also add
Census Division fixed effects to the specification.8 With these extra controls, the Sand State
dummy is identified by comparing the RESIDUAL BOOK VALUEs of MSAs in Sand States
to other MSAs in the same Census Division, instead of comparing them to all other MSAs.
The coefficient on Sand State dummy decreases in absolute value compared to column (1),
but it is still large. Being a MSA in a Sand State on average lowers the RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE of the MSA by about 0.77/1.4 = 55% of a standard deviation of RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE.
In column (3) of Table 4, we present the results of a regression of the rank of a MSAs
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on a dummy variable for the MSA being located in a Sand State.
We sort the 277 MSAs and assign a rank of 1 to the MSA with the highest residual, 2 to the
second highest residual MSA, etc. The coefficient on the Sand State dummy is negative and
large, suggesting that MSAs located in the Sand States are far down the residual ranking.
The magnitude indicates that on average Sand State MSAs are about 64 places lower down
the ranking. Adding Census Division fixed effects to the regression specification in column
(4) suggests that on average Sand State MSAs are about 52 places lower down the ranking.
8There are nine Census Divisions. They are New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Middle Atlantic
(NJ, NY, PA), South Atlantic (DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV), East South Central (AL, KY, MS,
TN), East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX), West North Central
(IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD), Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY), and Pacific (AK, CA,
HI, OR, WA).
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2.3. The Relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and
the Excesses of the MSA Housing Markets
After showing that MSAs located in Sand States on average have low supplies of local firms,
we now need to measure the relationship between changes in the housing market in the
2000s and RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. We start by concentrating on changes over time
in mortgage origination across MSAs. We break our sample into two periods: the bubble
period (2000-2006) and the crash (2007-2010). We then measure how various measures of
mortgage origination across MSAs are related to local firm supply.
Our first measure of mortgage origination is the average percentage change in total orig-
ination in a MSA. We regress this variable on the MSAs RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, the
MSAs supply elasticity, a dummy for the MSA having high growth in income during the
1990s, a dummy for the MSA having high growth in population during the 1990s and state
effects.9
The estimates using the bubble period sample and all MSAs are presented in column
(1), Panel A of Table 5. The coefficient on the RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is negative
and statistically different than zero (t-statistic = -3.3), indicating that MSAs with a smaller
supply of local firms experienced a bigger increase in total mortgage origination during the
bubble period. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation
decrease in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE (1.40) is associated with an increase in the annual
percentage growth of mortgages of -.013×-1.40 = 0.018. Given that the average annual
increase in total mortgage origination during this period with 27%, this implies a .018/.27
= 7% increase in the annual growth.
The coefficient on the housing supply elasticity suggests that more elastic MSAs experi-
enced a smaller increase in mortgages during the boom. Also, MSAs that grew more slowly
during the 1990s in terms of income experienced a higher growth in mortgages. This is con-
9Because some MSAs straddle more than one state, we turn on a state effect for all of the states a MSA
is located in. We have also run the models turning on a state effect only in the state the MSA has the most
population in. The results of these alternative specifications are very similar to what is presented.
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sistent with the literature, which finds that low income growth MSAs in this cycle had more
pronounced housing excesses due to subprime lending. This is contrary to what is typical,
in that higher income growth areas should have higher price growth. MSAs that had high
population growth, however, had larger growth as expected. We will come back to these two
factors later on when we see whether they can explain the Sand State effect.
In column (2), we show similar estimates using the crash sample. The coefficient on
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is now positive and statistically different than zero. MSAs with
smaller local firm supply experienced a bigger decline in mortgages than other MSAs during
the crash. The size of the coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is associated with a .018 × 1.40 = .025 bigger decline in the
annual growth rate of total mortgages during the crash. This is over 32% of the average
annual decline in total mortgage originations during this period.
So the results suggest that low local firm supply MSAs experienced a substantially larger
increase in total mortgages during the bubble and a bigger decline during the crash. It is
important to remember that because we include state effects in the regression specifications,
we are not identifying these estimates by comparing MSAs across large geographic areas.
For example, we are not using differences in the behavior of MSAs in Sand States compared
to other MSAs located in other parts of the country to identify these estimates. With the
state effects, we are comparing MSAs located in the same state and measuring whether the
MSAs with lower RESIDUAL BOOK VALUEs have bigger changes in mortgage origination.
In columns (3) and (4) of Panel A of Table 5, we show the results of similar regressions
presented in the first two columns except the dependent variable is now the annual percentage
change in mortgage origination of second homes. The main story of the results is very similar
to the results for total mortgages. Second home mortgages grow more in low local firm supply
MSAs during the boom and fall more during the bust. The magnitudes of the coefficients
are also similar to before. The coefficient on RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE in in column (3)
suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE increases the
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annual growth rate of second home mortgages during the bubble years by about 13%. A
similar calculation for the crash period suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is associated with a 6% lower decline in second mortgages.
In column (5) of Panel A of Table 5, we examine the relationship between RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE and the number of mortgage defaults in a MSA during the crash. The
coefficient on RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is negative and statistically different than zero,
suggesting that MSAs with a smaller supply of local firms experienced more mortgage de-
faults during the crash. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that a one standard
deviation decrease in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE (1.40) is associated with an increase of
defaults of about 0.004 × 1.40 = .0056. Given that the average default rate during the crash
was 0.05, this implies a .0056/.05 = 11% increase in the default rate.
In Panel B of Table 5 we run the same regressions as presented in Panel A, but we restrict
our sample to only the large MSAs. The basic story for the large MSAs is almost identical
to the conclusions from the entire sample. In fact, the implied magnitudes of the low local
firm supply on mortgages are typically larger using only the big MSAs. So our results are
not being driven by tiny cities.
We next turn to examining the relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and
home price appreciation. The regression specification is almost identical to our specification
for mortgage origination, but now the dependent variable is the average annual change in
home prices across MSAs.
The results are presented in Table 6. Panel A shows the results using all MSAs. Panel B
of Table 6 shows the results for only the large MSAs. The results are similar to Panel A. So
we will focus our discussion on Panel A. Column (1) uses the bubble sample period of 2000-
2006. The coefficient on RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is negative and statistically different
than zero (t-statistic = -2.2), indicating that MSAs with low local stock supply experienced a
larger growth in housing prices during the boom. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates
that a one standard deviation decrease in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE increases the annual
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growth of housing prices by about (.002 × 1.40)/.09=3% relative to the mean price growth
over this time.
The coefficient on the housing supply elasticity is the expected sign; more elastic MSAs
experienced a smaller increase in housing prices during the boom. MSAs with faster growing
total income in the 1990s experienced a smaller increase in housing prices during the bubble
period. The coefficient on the 1990s MSA high population growth dummy is positive but
small.
We hypothesize that the effect of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on the growth of house
prices in a MSA should depend on the supply elasticity of housing in that MSA. If the supply
is very elastic, there should probably be little effect of local stock supply on prices. In low
stock supply MSAs where the supply elasticity is very high, the market can adjust to the
higher demand for housing with little change in price. So we want to break up the effect
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE to see whether the effect is concentrated among MSAs with
lower supply elasticities.
These results are shown in column (2) of Table 6. We add to the regression specification
dummies for the quintile of supply elasticity of the MSA and the interaction of these sup-
ply elasticity quintiles with RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE.10 The coefficient on RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE is again negative and statistically different than zero. The magnitude of the
coefficient is substantially bigger in absolute value than the result in column (1), indicating
that the effect of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE for MSA in the bottom quintile of the supply
elasticity distribution is substantially bigger than the effect for the average MSA. The size
of the coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE increases the annual growth of housing prices by about (.008 × 1.40)/.09=12%.
The coefficients on the interactions of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and elasticity quintiles
are monotonically increasing with supply quintile. The effect of residual gets smaller as
supply elasticity gets larger; the coefficients on the interactions suggest that the effect of
10The omitted elasticity quintile is the lowest: MSAs with the lowest supply elasticity.
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RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is basically zero for MSAs in the top two elasticity quintiles.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 show the same specifications of the first two columns
except that the sample includes the bust years. Column (3) shows that low local firm
supply MSAs have a larger decline in prices during the bust compared to other MSAs. The
magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE is associated with a (.003 × 1.40)/.06=7% bigger decline than the average.
The results in column (4) again show that this average effect of RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE is concentrated among MSAs with low supply elasticities. For the most inelastic
MSAs, a one standard deviation decrease in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is associated with
a (.008 × 1.40)/.06=19% bigger decline than the average. Just like the results for the boom
period, RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE does not have much of an effect on MSAs in the highest
two supply elasticity quintiles.
We can present these housing price appreciation results graphically in Figure 2. The
figure shows the time-series of average home price appreciation by the groups of elasticity
and RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. We sort the MSAs into three housing supply elasticity
groups (Lowest Elasticity 1/3, Middle Elasticity 1/3 and Highest Elasticity 1/3).11 Then
independently, we sort the MSAs into a low versus high RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE groups.
The low RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE group is in Blue and the high RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE group in Red.
First, notice that in the highest housing supply elasticity MSAs, there is not a substantial
difference in the price appreciation of low and high local stock supply MSAs over the 2000-
2010 period. This is consistent with Glaeser et al. (2008) who show that housing supply
elasticity ought to dampen down any effects of speculative demand on prices.
We next consider the lowest housing supply elasticity MSAs. We see here that there are
now significant deviations between the blue low RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE MSAs and the
red high RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE MSAs. There is more of a cycle for the MSAs where
11We present the results with elasticity terciles to make the figure easier to read. As with the regressions,
we can split the MSAs into housing elasticity quintiles and obtain very similar results.
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real estate is the only game in town. The middle elasticity MSAs have a similar cycle as the
low elasticity MSAs.
2.4. Explaining Sand States with RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
We have shown that MSAs in Sand States are more likely to have low local stock supply.
Also, we have shown that MSAs with low local stock supply are more likely to have had
bigger increases in housing prices and mortgage origination during the housing boom and
that pattern turns around during the bust. So the obvious question to ask is how much of
the boom/bust pattern we see in the Sand States during the 2000s can be explained by the
fact that those MSAs are more likely to have low local stock supply.
To isolate this effect, our strategy is to use our previous estimates of the effect of RESID-
UAL BOOK VALUE on mortgage origination and housing price appreciation to predict how
mortgage origination and housing price appreciation would have changed over the 2000s if
there were no difference across MSAs in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. For example, we esti-
mate the effect of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on price appreciation using our model shown
in column (2) of Table 6. Using the coefficients of this model, we then predict what the
housing price appreciation would have been if every MSA had the same value of RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE.12 We can then regress this predicted housing price appreciation variable
on a dummy for the MSA being in a Sand State to see if the coefficient on this dummy
is substantially different than when we estimate a similar regression using the actual price
appreciation of the MSA.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 7. Column (1) shows the estimates of
the actual percentage change of total mortgage origination on a Sand State dummy for the
boom years. The coefficient on the Sand State dummy is positive and large. The coefficient
suggests that being in a Sand State increases the growth of mortgage origination during the
boom by about .08/.27=33%. This is an annual figure. So over the 7 years of the boom, this
12We set the value to zero for every MSA.
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implies an over 200% higher increase in Sand State MSAs than other MSAs. This striking
magnitude already controls for supply elasticity, the high income growth dummy, and high
population growth dummy.
In column (2), we present the results of the same regression, except the dependent variable
is the predicted growth in mortgage origination of MSAs if their RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
equals zero.13 The coefficient on the Sand State dummy is now substantially smaller. The
difference suggests that the only-game-in-town effect can explain about 34% of the greater
mortgage origination growth of MSAs in Sand States during the boom.
Columns (3) and (4) show the results of the same exercise for the bust years. The
coefficient on the Sand State dummy in column (3) is negative and large in absolute value.
Sand state MSAs experienced about a -.09/.08=113% larger decline in mortgage originations
than the average decline. The coefficient on the Sand State dummy in column (4) indicates
that the Sand State effect would have been 45% smaller without the only game in town
effect.
Columns (5) through (8) of Table 7 show the same set of results using measures of
growth in second home mortgages instead of total mortgages. The differences between the
baseline Sand State effect and the predicted effect if there was no only-game-in-town effect
are substantial. The results suggest that differences in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE can
explain at least half of the growth of second mortgages in MSAs located in Sand States
during the 2000s.
In columns (9) through columns (12), we show how the effect of a MSA being located
in a Sand State on price appreciation changes once we control for the only game in town
effect. The coefficient on the Sand State dummy in column (9) indicates that Sand States
experienced on average a .06/.09=67% higher price appreciation during the boom than other
MSAs. The results on column (10) show that after removing the price appreciation differences
13The coefficients on the models used to make these predictions of mortgage growth are presented in Table
A2. These models allow the effect of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE to vary across supply elasticity quintiles.
Table A3 shows the results of a similar model for mortgage defaults.
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across MSAs driven by differences in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, the Sand State dummy
is 11% smaller.
We find similar results for price appreciation during the bust. Unconditionally, Sand
State MSAs had on average a .08/08=100% larger decline in home prices during the bust
than other MSAs. However, after removing the variation associated with RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE, this extra decline in Sand States is 11% smaller.
Finally, in columns (13) and (14), we show how much that RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
can explain mortgage default rates during the crash. The coefficient on the Sand State
dummy in column (13) suggests that Sand States experienced on average a .07/.05=140%
higher default rate compared to other MSAs. The results in column (14) show that after
removing the mortgage default differences across MSAs driven by differences in RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE, the Sand State dummy is 15% smaller.
This exercise indicates that a substantial part of the excess growth of mortgages and
prices in Sand States during the housing boom and the excess declines of those measures
in the bust can be attributed to the fact that sand state MSAs on average have low local
stock supply. Almost half of the excess movement of total mortgage origination (and all
of second home mortgage origination volatility) in the Sand States during the 2000s can
be explained with an only-game-in-town effect. About 14% of the price volatility can be
similarly explained.
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results for large MSAs. Here it is interesting to note
that our effects are substantially larger that of the all MSAs sample. For instance, for total
mortgage origination, accounting for RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE leads to a decline in the
Sand State dummy of 34% in Panel A. The analogous number is a decline of 105% in Panel
B. That is, among large MSAs, the only-game-in-town effect virtually wipes out the Sand
States effect. The same is true for investment home mortgage origination. For the price
appreciation from 2000-2006, the magnitude goes from -11% to -60%.
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3. Household Portfolio Tilt Toward Investment Homes
Having established the importance of the local supply of equities for the Sand State effect,
we turn to identifying the mechanism at the heart of these results. Namely, in low local
supply of equities MSAs, households turn to buying investment homes as opposed to stocks,
thereby creating the amplification effect that we show previously can explain the Sand States
effect. To do this, we bring to bear new data from the Survey of Consumer Finance.
3.1. Data from the SCF
As a survey of household finances and wealth, the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) in-
cludes some assets that are broadly shared across the population (e.g. bank savings accounts)
as well as some that are held more narrowly and that are concentrated in the tails of the
distribution (e.g. direct ownership of bonds). To support estimates of a variety of financial
characteristics as well as the overall distribution of wealth, the survey employs a dual-frame
sample design.
A national area-probability (AP) sample provides good coverage of widely spread char-
acteristics. The AP sample selects household units with equal probability from primary
sampling units that are selected through a multistage selection procedure, which includes
stratification by a variety of characteristics, and selection proportional to their population.
Because of the concentration of assets and non-random survey response by wealth, the
SCF also employs a list sample which is developed from statistical records derived from tax
returns under an agreement with the IRS.14 (See Kennickell (2000) for additional details
on the SCF list sample.) This list sample consists of households with a high probability of
having high net worth.15
14See Wilson and William J. Smith (1983) and Internal Revenue Service for a description of the SOI file.
The file used for each survey largely contains data from tax returns filed for the tax year two years before
the year the survey takes place. See Kennickell (1998) for a detailed description of the selection of the 1998
list sample.
15For reasons related to cost control on the survey, the geographic distribution of the list sample is
constrained to that of the area-probability sample.
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The SCF joins the observations from the AP and list sample through weighting.16 The
weighting design adjusts each sample separately using all the useful information that can be
brought to bear in creating post-strata. The final weights are adjusted so that the combined
sample is nationally representative of the population and assets. These weights are used in
all regressions.
3.2. Merging RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE with the SCF
For our analysis, we focus on the 65 MSAs with population larger than 750,000. We con-
centrate only on bigger MSAs because we want to make sure that there are many SCF
households in the MSAs we examine. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is available at the MSA-
level and is merged into the SCF data in the following way. A new MSA variable is created
in the SCF using a state and county FIPS to MSA correspondence consistent with the geog-
raphy used in calculating RATIO. The RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE variable is merged into
the 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 waves of the SCF data by MSA.17
Ultimately, there are around 18,000 households sampled by the SCF between 1995 and
2010 that are used in this portion of the analysis. Because of the multiple imputation process
(five implicates to generate a distribution for the imputed values) for missing values, there
are 89,956 household-level records in the data. Standard errors in the SCF regressions are
based on weighted data, and also are adjusted for the multiple implicates.
16The evolution of the SCF weighting design is summarized in Kennickell (2000), with additional back-
ground by Kennickell and Woodburn (1992).
17Starting in the 2001, the public-use version of the SCF does not include any geographic identifiers.
Prior to 2001 the public-use version only included the very broad 9-level Census Division code. There is an
internal version of the survey, however, that is available only to the Board of Governors economists working
on the SCF that has MSA-level (and lower levels of geography including zip-code and county) identification
of where the household resides. These geographic variables were used to merge the RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE variable into the SCF.
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3.3. Definitions of Investment Real Estate and Stock Holdings
A group of dependent variables derived from the SCF are represented as shares: they sum
the dollar value of the household’s portion of all investment real estate, vacation home, or
directly-held stocks, and divide by total assets. The SCF clearly identifies primary residences
and second homes. Investment real estate is aggregated from the following sub-categories
given by the SCF in the “property type” variable (x1703, x1803, and x1903): code 11 (land
only: lot, tract, acreage; building lots,“farmland”); code 13 (substantial land and other type
of structure); code 15 (recreational property; sports field; golf course); code 24 (mobile home
park); code 40 (one single family home); code 41 (multiple single family homes); code 42
(duplex 2 unit residence); code 43 (triplex); code 44 (fourplex); code 45 (5 or more); code
46 (apartment house, units unknown, rental units, or property nfs); code 47 (other business
commercial property); code 48 (business/commercial and residential combination); code 49
(condo; co-op); and code 50 (residential, nec.).18
% INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE is then the dollar value of investment real estate
divided by the household’s total assets. Vacation homes are aggregated from the following
categories reported by SCF: code 21 (seasonal/vacation); code 25 (time share); code 12 (sub-
stantial land and seasonal or other residence); and code 999 (other vacation home mapped
from the mop-up). Analogously, we calculate % VACATION HOME. We also have data on
how much households own of stocks. We calculate % DIRECTLY-HELD STOCKS as the
fraction of directly-held stock holdings in a household’s total asset.
We report in Table 8 the summary statistics of the SCF for the 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004,
18As a robustness check of our results, we consider different definitions of investment real estate. First,
we define investment real estate as strictly residential. Specifically, we consider the following subset of
codes: code 24 (mobile home park); code 40 (one single family home); code 41 (multiple single family
homes); code 42 (duplex 2 unit residence); code 43 (triplex); code 44 (fourplex); code 45 (5 or more);
code 46 (apartment house, units unknown, rental units, or property nfs); code 48 (business/commercial and
residential combination); code 49 (condo; co-op); and code 50 (residential, nec.). Second, the SCF asks
whether the household or Primary Economic Unit (PEU) earns any money (and how much) from other
real estate. This definition of investment real estate simply takes the asset value for those other properties
that are generating income for the PEU. We find that both definitions show similar results to our original
definition above.
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2007, and 2010 waves. In our sample of households, they are more apt to have an investment
real estate than a vacation home. % INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE, the fraction of invest-
ment real estate in household’s total asset, has a mean of 0.03 with a standard deviation of
0.10. % VACATION HOME, the fraction of vacation home in household’s total asset, has a
mean of 0.01 with a standard deviation of 0.04. % DIRECTLY-HELD STOCKS (as opposed
to held through intermediated vehicles such as mutual funds), the fraction of directly-held
stock holdings in household’s total asset, has a mean of 0.02 with a standard deviation of
0.08.
In addition to these share variables, we also create related dummy variables to capture
whether households have any investment real estate, vacation home or directly-held stocks.
HAVE INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE equals one if the household has any investment real
estate and zero otherwise. The mean is 0.13 with a standard deviation of 0.34. So 13% of
our households own some investment real estate. HAVE VACATION HOME equals one if
the household has a vacation home and zero otherwise. The mean is 0.06 with a standard
deviation of 0.24. HAVE DIRECTLY-HELD STOCKS equals one if the household has any
directly-held stock and zero otherwise. The mean is 0.21 with a standard deviation of 0.41.
Overall, our households are more likely to have stocks than investment homes and more
likely to have investment homes than vacation homes.
In Table 8, we also report summary statistics for our controls for household demographics
and MSA economic and housing conditions. MSA Unemployment Rate is unemployment rate
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The mean is 5.65 and standard deviation is 2.26. MSA
Home Price Index is the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Housing Price Index at
the MSA level and has a mean of 163 with a standard deviation of about 54. MSA Housing
Affordability Index is the Housing Affordability Index from the National Association of
Realtors.19 The Housing Affordability Index measures whether or not a family with median
income could qualify for a mortgage on a median-priced home. A higher index value indicates
19http://www.realtor.org/topics/housing-affordability-index
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that a median-priced home is more affordable to a median income family. Since the index is
available only for 2009 to 2011, we backfilled the data using time-series average of available
Housing Affordability Index. The Housing Affordability Index has a mean of 120 with a
standard deviation of about 58.
log HOUSE PRICE ZIP CODE is a home price index at zip code level from Zillow and
has a mean of 12.22 with a standard deviation of about 0.64. We mainly use FHFA MSA
home price index in our analysis, but we use Zillow home price index when we control for
home prices at the zip code level since FHFA data are only available at the MSA level.20
FAMILY SIZE is the number of people in each Primary Economic Unit. Our households
have on average around 2.44 members with a standard deviation of 1.42. Log HOUSEHOLD
INCOME has a mean of 10.87, which is around 53 thousand dollars. The SCF Survey is
ideal for our study because it includes higher net worth households who are most likely to
be able to purchase an investment real estate. HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH has a mean of
about 600,000 dollars with a standard deviation of 4,100,000. UNATTACHED FEMALE is
an indicator that the family is headed by an unattached woman. About 27% of our samples
are headed by an unattached woman. Table 2 also reports the breakdown of AGE of the
head of each household. The sample is meant to be nationally representative and as such we
see a distribution across the age cohorts. We also break down RACE. 68% of the households
are white and 16% are black. Hispanics account for 10% of the households and Asians or
others account for the remaining 5%.
We also break down EDUCATION of the head of each household. 13% have less than
a high school education. 28% have high school or GED equivalent. 25% went to some
college but do not have a Bachelor’s degree. 21% have a Bachelor’s degree. 7% have a
Master’s degree and 6% have an advanced degree such as PhD, JD, MD, or MBA. FAMILY
STRUCTURE breaks down situations like whether or not the couple is married and has
children. Here LWP stands for the “living with partner”.
20In the last part of our analysis, we also use Zillow prices in conjunction with monthly dollar rent by
county from US Department of Housing and Urban Development to construct house price-to-rent ratios.
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3.4. Average FICO Scores by Zip Code
Because we know in the SCF the zip code of residence of each household, we can match the
average FICO score of the residents of the household’s zip code to the other information
we have about the household. Similar to previous studies such as Mian and Sufi (2009), we
divide zip codes into quartiles based on their average FICO scores. Table 9 presents the range
of average FICO scores by quartile. Subprime borrowers are usually defined as having FICO
scores below 660. The lowest quartile of zip codes have average FICO scores well below the
subprime cut-off. For the second lowest quartile, the mean of the zip code FICO measures
is only slightly above the subprime cut-off. Only in the top half of zip codes in the average
FICO distribution is the typical household well above subprime. For much of our analysis,
we will compare the results of households living in the top and bottom quartile of the zip
code FICO distribution. Table 10 shows that we are then comparing households living in
neighborhoods with predominately prime borrowers with households living in neighborhoods
with predominantly subprime borrowers. Households in the SCF sample are roughly evenly
distributed across the four FICO quartiles: 16% in the lowest FICO score group, 29% in the
second group, 32% in the third group and 23% in the highest FICO score group.
3.5. Demographics and Portfolio Tilt between Investment Homes
and Stocks
We begin in Table 10 by reporting the household-level panel logit regression results, mea-
suring how household demographic characteristics affect dummy variables for investment
real estate and stock ownership. In our baseline specification, we estimate a logit model of
the asset holding indicator on the following household characteristics: RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE, HIGH FICO ZIP CODE INDICATOR, log HOUSEHOLD INCOME, log HOUSE-
HOLD NET WORTH, UNATTACHED FEMALE, AGE, RACE and EDUCATION. Also,
included in all the logit specifications are year effects and a series of other household level
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controls for FAMILY STRUCTURE, and a linear and square term of FAMILY SIZE. For
brevity, we do not report these coefficients on FAMILY STRUCTURE, and a linear and
square term of FAMILY SIZE.
In column (1), the dependent variable is the dummy variable HAVE INVESTMENT
REAL ESTATE. The coefficient in front of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE in column (1) is
-0.120 with a t-statistic of -4.34. Households are less likely to own an investment real estate
if they live in a high RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE MSA with lots of stocks headquartered
there. The marginal effect is -0.012. This suggests that a one standard deviation increase in
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE (0.96) decreases the probability of a household owning invest-
ment real estate by about 0.012 (.012 × 0.96). Given that the unconditional probability is
around 0.13, this is about a 9% decline in the probability.
Also, households living in high average FICO zip codes are less likely to hold investment
real estate than other households (i.e. households in a low average FICO zip code).21 The
coefficient on High FICO Zip Code indicator is -0.285 with a t-statistic of -4.84. All else
equal, households in prime zip codes are less likely to own investment homes than those in
higher-risk or subprime zip codes.
Not surprisingly, higher income, wealth and age substantially increase the likelihood of
owning investment real estate. Being an unattached female substantially lowers the proba-
bility of owning a home. Non-white households are more likely to hold investment real estate
(though only the dummy for being Black or Hispanic is statistically significant), conditional
on income and wealth.
There are many potential reasons for why households in high FICO zip codes and white
households hold less investment homes (and as we discuss in columns (3)-(4) below simultane-
ously hold more stocks) compared to those in low FICO zip codes and non-white households,
respectively. This heterogeneity in preferences for homes versus stocks can be traced from
the household finance literature to investor sophistication, familiarity with homes either due
21Households in the top 25% of the FICO score distribution are classified as living in low risk zip codes.
Households in the bottom 25% of the FICO score distribution are classified as living in a high risk zip code.
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to type of employment (such as construction) or other social interaction and cultural biases.
We take this underlying heterogeneity in preferences as given and will use it to our advantage
to measure our only-game-in-town effect.
Toward this end, we need to consider potential confounders that muddy the interpretation
of the relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and household investment real estate
decisions. As seen in Figure 3, there is some spatial correlation in RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE across the US. It tends to be higher in MSAs in the Northeast and lower in the
West and the South. MSAs in the Midwest are likely to be in the middle of the RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE distribution. We are worried that there might be different types of investors
living in Northeast MSAs than other parts of the country. In other words, we see for instance
that certain types of households (non-white, living in low FICO zip codes) prefer investment
homes to stocks. To the extent that different MSAs might have different proportions of
these households, we might incorrectly interpret the correlation of investment decisions and
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE as an only-game-in-town effect.
Much of our subsequent empirical work will involve trying to rule out this alternative ex-
planation for the relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and investment behavior.
To attempt to address such unobservables, we first try to identify the relationship between
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and investment real estate behavior without using cross-region
variation in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. In column (2), we re-estimate these relationships
but now also include Census Division × Year effects in the logit specification. Therefore,
comparisons of the behavior of households in Northeast MSAs to households in the South
are not being used to estimate the propensity of households to hold investment real estate.
All our results from column (2) are similar to those from column (1). The coefficient on
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE in column (2) is now -0.078 and with a t-statistic of -2.37. A
one standard deviation increase in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE decreases the probability
that a household holds investment real estate by again about 6% of the unconditional mean,
similar in magnitude to column (1). Therefore, our results are not being driven by across
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Census region comparisons of MSAs.
Both of these logit specifications indicate that households in MSAs with a higher RESID-
UAL BOOK VALUE are less likely to hold investment real estate. Panel A of Figure 4 shows
a residual scatter plot of the relationship between investment real estate holding and RESID-
UAL BOOK VALUE at the MSA level. The regression specification is the same as the one
shown in column (1) of Table 10. Residualized RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE averaged at the
MSA level is plotted against residualized investment real estate holding propensity again
at the MSA level. The scatter plot shows how the negative relationship between the two
variables is measured.
For the rest of the results shown in Table 10, we examine the relationship between
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and the propensity for households to directly hold stocks. Recall
that our hypothesis suggests that in MSAs with fewer stocks nearby, households are also less
likely to have directly-held stocks in their portfolio. The specifications in columns (3)-(4)
are identical to the first two columns of Table 10 except that the outcome variable is instead
an indicator for directly-held stocks.
Consistent with an only-game-in-town effect, we find in both of our specifications a
positive and statistically significant relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and
the propensity to hold stocks directly. The coefficient of interest in column (3) is 0.100 with
a t-statistic of 4.08. A one standard deviation increase in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is
associated with an 6% increase in the probability that a household holds stock relative to
the unconditional probability. Households from high FICO zip codes are also more likely to
own stock. So are households with higher income and net worth and younger households.
Households with an unattached female as head are less likely to own stock. Non-whites are
less likely to own stock, whereas more educated households are more likely to own stock.
These latter two findings are consistent with Hong et al. (2004). Removing across-region
variation in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE by adding Census Division by year effects in the
specification in column (4) again does not change the coefficient on RESIDUAL BOOK
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VALUE or the coefficients on the other covariates.22
Having examined just the extensive margin, i.e., the decision to own or not own in-
vestment homes and stocks, we now turn to examining how RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
affects the total amount of investment real estate and stocks a household holds measured
as a percentage of the household’s portfolio devoted to those two assets. Table 11 presents
these results. It is identical to Table 10 in structure except for two changes. In columns
(1)-(2), the dependent variable is the percentage of a household’s portfolio devoted to in-
vestment real estate instead of an indicator for holding investment real estate. Similarly, in
columns (3)-(4), the dependent variable is the percentage of a household’s portfolio devoted
to stocks. Because the dependent variables in Table 12 are fractions bounded between 0 and
1, we estimate the models using tobits instead of logits.
In columns (1)-(2) of Table 11, the relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
and the amount of households’ portfolios devoted to investment real estate is again similar
to the logit results. The coefficient of interest in column (1) is -.0088 with a t-statistic of
-4.89. Similar to the logit results, the magnitude of the coefficient on RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE is unaffected by the inclusion of Census Division by year effects in column (2). The
coefficients on RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE in columns (1)-(2) imply that the effect of a one
standard deviation increase in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on the percentage of assets in
investment real estate ranges from a decrease of 27 to 28% relative to the mean. Panel B of
Figure 4 shows the residualized scatter plot of the relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE at the MSA level and the residualized average percent holding of investment real
estate again at the MSA level.
The coefficients on the other demographic characteristics are again very similar to the
logit results reported in Table 10. Households living in higher average FICO zip codes have
22One might worry that our findings in columns (3)-(4) of Table 11 are somehow hard-wired. If we know
that an MSA has fewer stocks, does not that mean that households there necessarily are less likely to be
tilted toward stocks? This is not the case. For instance, it is possible that an MSA with a lower supply
of equities could actually have all of its shares held by locals, giving us a negative rather than a positive
coefficient of interest.
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less of their portfolio devoted to investment real estate. Non-white households hold a higher
percentage of investment homes, holding all else equal. Similar coefficients are found in
column (2) when we introduce Census Division × year effects.
In columns (3)-(4), we show there is a positive and statistically significant effect of
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on the proportion of a household’s assets devoted to stocks.
The coefficient of interest in column (3) is 0.0068 with a t-statistic of 5.44. The tobit coeffi-
cients suggest that a one standard deviation increase in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE raises
a household’s holding of stocks about 33% relative to the mean. Households living in high
FICO zip codes own more stocks and the economic effect is also large.
In sum, we have established three novel patterns in Tables 10 and 11. First, that house-
holds in high RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE MSAs are, all else equal, less likely to own invest-
ment homes and more likely to own stocks. Second, households in high FICO zip codes tilt
away from real estate investment homes and towards stocks compared to their low FICO
zip code counterparts. Third, white households tilt towards stocks as opposed to investment
real estate compared to their non-white counterparts.
3.6. Interacting RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and High FICO Zip
Code Indicator and Including MSA × Year Effects
Even with Census×Year Effects, we might still worry that there is significant variation across
MSAs within the same Census Division in the type of households living in these MSAs. In
other words, we know that certain types of households prefer investment homes to stocks.
To the extent that different MSAs, even if they are in the same Census Division, might have
different proportions of these households in a way that is correlated with RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE, we might incorrectly interpret the RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE correlation as an
only-game-in-town effect.
To address this concern, we estimate an empirical model that measures the behavior of
households within a MSA. To set up this specification, first recall that households in the top
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25% of the FICO score distribution are classified as living in low risk zip codes. Households
in the bottom 25% of the FICO score distribution are classified as living in a high risk zip
code. We leave out the middle 50% of the FICO distribution to make sure we are comparing
households across a wide range of average FICO scores. Then, within each MSA, we can
calculate the difference in propensities to buy investment homes between households living
in high FICO zip codes and low FICO zip codes and then see how this difference varies
across MSAs by RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. There will be somewhat different proportions
of these households across MSAs, but the key is within every MSA we have some investors
in both groups.
We expect that in low RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE MSAs even households in high FICO
zip codes will tilt toward investment homes because there are few local stocks for them to
invest in. That is, in MSAs with few local firms, the behavior of households in low FICO
and high FICO zip codes ought to be more similar than in MSAs with many local firms.
Everyone, even high FICO households who might on average have a preference for stocks
as opposed to investment homes, is tilted toward investment homes in MSAs with few local
firm if our only-game-in-town effect holds.
To see if this is the case, we estimate models where an indicator for having investment
real estate is regressed on RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, an indicator for living in a high FICO
score zip code, an interaction of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and the high FICO score zip
code indicator and other controls. The coefficient of interest is on the interaction term; it
tells us whether the difference in behavior between households in high versus low FICO zip
codes varies with RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE in the way we predict.
One of the benefits of this difference-in-differences specification is that we can include
MSA by year effects in the model and still identify the interaction term. This is because
there is variation in the interaction term within MSA by year cells because some households
live within low and high risk zip codes within the same MSA at the same time. Therefore,
we can difference out MSA-level differences in investor preferences.
29
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 12 show the results with an indicator for having investment
real estate as the dependent variable.23 In column (1), we present the model without the
interaction term to show that we obtain a similar negative relationship between RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE and the probability of holding investment real estate even for this smaller
sample of households living in high and low FICO score zip codes. Notice that the coefficient
on living in a high FICO zip code is negative and similar in magnitude to our earlier results.
The coefficient, -.0099 with a t-statistic of -1.92, is comparable in economic magnitude to the
implied economic effect from the logit specification in column (1) 1 of Table 11. However,
not surprisingly the coefficient is more imprecise because we have omitted roughly half of
our sample.
In column (2), we add the interaction term and MSA by year fixed effects to the regression
specification. The coefficient of interest is -.0221 with a t-statistic of -3.01. The value of
the interaction term indicates that the negative sensitivity of investment real estate holding
to log RATIO is larger for households in high FICO zip codes. In fact, given that the
magnitude of the interaction term (-.0221) is over two times larger than the average effect of
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE for the entire sample (-.0099) and that the fraction of low and
high FICO households are roughly comparable, we can conclude that almost all the average
effect of log RATIO on owning investment real estate is coming from the sensitivity of high
FICO households’ investment behavior to RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE.
Columns (3) and (4) show similar results for the models that look at the percentage
of investment real estate held by household. The basic relationship between RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE and real estate investment holdings in column (3) is again similar to the
results previously shown in Table 11. Again, the coefficient here is less precise than before
because we have dropped roughly half the sample in drawing a comparison between the
extreme low and high FICO groups. The interaction term in column (4) is -.0051 with a t-
23We use linear probability models in Table 12 instead of logits and tobits. The interaction terms are
easier to interpret in linear models. If we estimate the logits and tobits presented earlier as linear models,
we find very similar quantitative and qualitative results.
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statistic -2.11. It is about the same size as the average effect of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
on the percentage of investment home as a fraction of total assets. So we can conclude
that similar to the extensive margin, the effect of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on the total
portfolio weight in investment homes is about twice as big for high FICO households.
We have shown before that households living in high FICO zip codes want to hold less
investment real estate and more stocks than other households. But in MSAs with few
local stock investment opportunities (low RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE) households living
in high FICO zip codes look more like households living in low FICO zip codes. They do
not move away from investment real estate as much as households in MSAs with many
local stock investments. In fact, our regression estimates allow us to calculate how much
of a movement in RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is necessary to offset this level difference in
the propensity of households in high and low FICO neighborhoods to hold investment real
estate. Our estimates suggests that a one standard deviation (0.96) decrease in a MSA’s
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE increases the probability that households in high FICO zip
codes hold investment real estate enough to offset the level difference between households in
low and high FICO zip codes.
3.7. Robustness Checks
We have completed several addtional analyses to show the robustness of our SCF results.
For brevity, we will only briefly describe these exercises. In an Internet appendix, we will
describe these results more fully. First, we show that our FICO difference-in-difference
results are robust to including all observations, not just households from the top and bottom
FICO quartile. Second, we show that in a horserace, the interaction of RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE and High FICO is robust to the inclusion of other interactions of RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE with demographic controls such as education and race. Then we show that there is
no relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and whether households own vacation
homes.
31
Finally, we show that our difference-in-difference results are robust to controls for con-
ditions in MSAs. First, we show that controlling for housing affordability in a MSA does
not substantially change our results. Lastly, we show that controlling for MSA economic
conditions in a variety of ways again does not change our conclusions.
4. Conclusion
We show that the excesses of the historic US housing cycle of the 2000s, which were concen-
trated in the Sand States and difficult to rationalize using existing factors, can be explained
by an only-game-in-town effect. Sand State MSAs having an abnormally low supply of pub-
lic equities (measured using the book value of firms headquartered there) relative to total
income. This only-game-in-town factor can explain about 34% of the excess total mortgage
originations, nearly all of the excess of investment home mortgage originations, and about
11% of the excess price volatility of the Sand States.
We argue that the reason is that local biased households purchase investment homes
nearby rather than owning stocks, thereby amplifying the housing cycle in these MSAs. We
confirm this mechanism using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We establish
that households residing in an MSA with few publicly traded firms headquartered there are
more likely to purchase an investment home nearby. Households in these areas are also less
likely to own stocks. We use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to show that we
are capturing our only-game-in-town effect as opposed to heterogeneity in preferences across
MSAs.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Investment and Vacation Home Purchases
Panel A reports the distance of second homes from primary residences from the Investment and Vacation Home Buyers Survey
by the National Association of Realtors. The number of respondents for the Survey was 8205 for year 2004, 1034 for year 2005,
1965 for year 2007, 1924 for year 2008, 1930 for year 2009, 1895 for year 2010, 2241 for year 2011, 2326 for year 2012, and
2008 for year 2013. Panel B reports the number of home sales by intended use. The share in total home sales are reported in
parenthesis.
Panel A: Distance from Primary Residence
Vacation Properties (%) 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2005 2004
5 miles or less 2 7 2 2 2 2 4
3
44
6 to 10 miles 4 4 3 3 4 2
2
11 to 15 miles 6 2 2 3 1 1
4
16 to 20 miles 6 5 4 4 3 4 4
21 to 50 miles 13 6 10 8 8 7 7 8
19
51 to 100 miles 15 10 14 11 16 19 18 19
101 to 500 miles 20 20 27 27 27 30 30 31 23
501 to 1000 miles 12 15 11 11 12 14 12 9 3
1001 miles or more 22 31 26 30 28 22 22 25 10
Median (miles) 180 435 305 375 348 316 287 220 49
Investment Properties (%) 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2005 2004
5 miles or less 15 24 17 20 18 24 16
52
69
6 to 10 miles 15 13 9 13 12 11 11
11 to 15 miles 10 6 12 8 9 8 8
17
16 to 20 miles 10 7 10 15 9 11 13
21 to 50 miles 12 15 13 12 11 8 15 6
9
51 to 100 miles 9 6 10 4 9 7 10 5
101 to 500 miles 10 10 10 10 11 12 12 8 5
501 to 1000 miles 8 8 7 5 7 8 6 3 3
1001 miles or more 12 11 13 13 14 11 10 9 14
Median (miles) 20 21 25 19 24 19 27 10 18
Panel B: Home Sales by Intended Use
Primary Residences Vacation Properties Investment Properties
2003 4,844,000 (67%) 850,000 (12%) 1,572,000 (22%)
2004 5,106,000 (64%) 872,000 (11%) 2,003,000 (25%)
2005 5,023,000 (60%) 1,019,000 (12%) 2,317,000 (28%)
2006 4,817,000 (64%) 1,067,000 (14%) 1,646,000 (22%)
2007 3,925,000 (67%) 670,000 (12%) 1,221,000 (21%)
2008 3,207,000 (70%) 436,000 (9%) 951,000 (21%)
2009 3,441,000 (73%) 471,000 (10%) 801,000 (17%)
2010 3,294,000 (73%) 469,000 (10%) 749,000 (17%)
2011 2,785,000 (61%) 502,000 (11%) 1,233,000 (27%)
2012 3,268,000 (65%) 553,000 (11%) 1,207,000 (24%)
2013 3,697,000 (67%) 717,000 (13%) 1,104,000 (20%)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A reports the summary statistics for all MSAs. Log Total Book Value is the log of average total book value of firms
headquartered in a MSA from 1996 to 2000 from COMPUSTAT. Log Total Income is the log of average total income in a MSA
from 1996 to 2000 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total book value
on the quadratic form of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000. Supply Elasticity is the housing supply elasticity of
MSAs from Saiz (2010). Annual Home Price Appreciation is the average of annual percentage increase in MSA home price
index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Annual % Change in Total MTG Origination is the average annual percentage
change in total mortgage origination amount in a MSA from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data. Annual % Change
in Second Home MTG Origination is the average annual percentage change in second home mortgage origination amount in
a MSA. Mortgage Default Rate is the ratio of the number of Notice Of Default from the RealtyTrac from 2007 to 2010 in a
MSA to the number of mortgage origination from HMDA from 2000 to 2006 in a MSA. We report population-weighted mean
and standard deviation using MSA population in 2000. Panel B reports the summary statistics for large MSAs with average
population above 750000.
Panel A: All MSAs
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
log Total Book Value 277 23.50 2.94 10.37 27.36
log Total Income 277 17.81 1.50 14.33 20.29
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE 277 0.06 1.40 -9.41 5.60
Supply Elasticity 277 1.72 1.05 0.63 12.15
From 2000 to 2006
Annual Home Price Appreciation 277 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.18
Annual % Change in Total MTG Origination 277 0.27 0.09 0.08 1.01
Annual % Change in Second Home MTG Origination 277 0.36 0.25 0.05 5.45
From 2007 to 2010
Annual Home Price Appreciation 277 -0.05 0.05 -0.22 0.03
Annual % Change in Total MTG Origination 277 -0.08 0.12 -0.42 0.30
Annual % Change in Second Home MTG Origination 277 -0.16 0.16 -0.44 2.39
Mortgage Default Rate 277 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.28
Panel B: Large MSAs
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
log Total Book Value 65 24.79 1.64 18.40 27.36
log Total Income 65 18.51 1.03 16.38 20.29
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE 65 0.09 0.96 -3.51 2.23
Supply Elasticity 65 1.44 0.79 0.63 4.00
From 2000 to 2006
Annual Home Price Appreciation 65 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.18
Annual % Change in Total MTG Origination 65 0.28 0.09 0.13 0.58
Annual % Change in Second Home MTG Origination 65 0.37 0.14 0.18 0.90
From 2007 to 2010
Annual Home Price Appreciation 65 -0.06 0.05 -0.21 0.01
Annual % Change in Total MTG Origination 65 -0.08 0.11 -0.40 0.13
Annual % Change in Second Home MTG Origination 65 -0.18 0.09 -0.42 0.08
Mortgage Default Rate 65 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.25
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Table 3: RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
We report estimates of the relationship of log Total Income on log Total Book Value. Log Total Book Value is the log of average
total book value of firms headquartered in a MSA from 1996 to 2000 and log Total Income is the log of average total income
in a MSA from 1996 to 2000. Panel A reports regression results with various specifications. Column (1) shows the result with
linear form, column (2) shows the result with quadratic form, and column (3) shows the result with cubic form. Panel B reports
the correlation matrix of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUEs from different specifications. The table reports point estimates with
t-statistics in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: Various specifications for RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
(1) (2) (3)
Variables log Total Book Value
log Total Income 2.275*** 13.52*** 84.66*
(17.99) (4.86) (1.88)
log Total Income Square -0.338*** -4.572*
(-4.05) (-1.71)
log Total Income Cubic 0.084
(1.58)
Constant -16.39*** -109.2*** -505.9**
(-8.06) (-4.75) (-2.01)
Observations 277 277 277
Adjusted R-squared .539 0.563 0.566
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUEs
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE: Linear Form 1
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE: Quadratic Form 0.971 1
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE: Cubic Form 0.967 0.996 1
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Table 4: RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and Sand States
We report estimates of the relationship of Sand State dummy on RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. Columns (1)-(2) report the results
on RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total book value on the quadratic form of
log total income using years from 1996 to 2000. Sand State dummy equals to 1 for MSAs in Arizona, California, Florida, or
Nevada. Column (1) shows the result without division fixed effects and column (2) shows the result with division fixed effects.
Columns (3)-(4) report the results on the rankings of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE among 277 MSAs. The MSA with highest
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE gets 1st RANK and the MSA with lowest RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE gets 277th RANK. Column
(3) shows the result without division fixed effects and column (4) shows the result with division fixed effects. We use MSA
population in 2000 as a weight for all regression results. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. We
use robust standard errors. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE RANK
Sand State Dummy -1.135*** -0.771*** 63.98*** 51.81***
(-4.02) (-3.46) (4.78) (4.09)
Constant 0.324** 131.8***
(2.03) (13.39)
Observations 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.120 0.157 0.186 0.257
Division FE No Yes No Yes
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Table 5: RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and Mortgage Origination/Default
We report estimates of the relationship of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on annual % change in mortgage origination and mortgage
default rate. Panel A shows the results with all MSAs. Columns (1)-(2) report the results on average annual % Change in Total
Mortgage Origination. Column (1) shows result for the period of 2000 to 2006 and column (2) shows the result for the period of
2007 to 2010. We control for RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, Supply Elasticity, High Income Growth Dummy, High POP Growth
Dummy and include state fixed effects. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total book value on the quadratic form
of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000. High Income Growth Dummy is an indicator for MSAs with above median
income growth rate during 1990 to 2000. High POP Growth Dummy is an indicator for MSAs with above median population
growth during 1990 to 2000. Columns (3)-(4) report the results on annual % Change in Second Home Mortgage Origination.
Column (3) shows result for the period of 2000 to 2006 and column (4) shows the result for the period of 2007 to 2010. Columns
(5) reports the result on mortgage default rate. For each MSA, Mortgage Default Rate is the ratio of the number of Notice Of
Default from the RealtyTrac from 2007 to 2010 to the number of mortgage origination from HMDA from 2000 to 2006. Panel
B shows the results only with large MSAs whose average population is above 750000. We use MSA population in 2000 as a
weight for all regression results. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. We use robust standard
errors. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: All MSAs
Annual % Change in Annual % Change in Second Mortgage
Total Mortgage Origination Home Mortgage Origination Default Rate
2000-2006 2007-2010 2000-2006 2007-2010 2007-2010
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.013*** 0.018*** -0.033 0.008 -0.004***
(-3.33) (4.04) (-1.51) (1.46) (-3.05)
Supply Elasticity -0.008* 0.009 -0.010 0.048** -0.002
(-1.88) (1.18) (-0.68) (2.10) (-1.05)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.050*** 0.056** -0.033 -0.002 -0.015**
(-3.54) (2.48) (-0.95) (-0.07) (-2.60)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.070*** -0.072*** 0.021 -0.054** 0.021***
(3.86) (-2.77) (0.48) (-2.35) (2.73)
Observations 277 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.748 0.741 0.283 0.445 0.909
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Large MSAs
Annual % Change in Annual % Change in Second Mortgage
Total Mortgage Origination Home Mortgage Origination Default Rate
2000-2006 2007-2010 2000-2006 2007-2010 2007-2010
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.042*** 0.058*** -0.032** 0.044*** -0.016***
(-4.33) (4.31) (-2.20) (3.34) (-3.20)
Supply Elasticity 0.008 0.021 0.042 0.028 -0.011
(0.42) (0.84) (0.93) (0.83) (-1.37)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.051*** 0.078*** -0.081** 0.037 -0.013
(-3.09) (3.28) (-2.73) (1.26) (-1.61)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.053* -0.047 0.018 0.004 0.021
(1.74) (-1.25) (0.37) (0.09) (1.47)
Observations 65 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.968 0.955 0.965 0.938 0.973
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and Home Price Appreciation
We report estimates of the relationship of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on annual home price appreciation. Panel A shows the
results with all MSAs. Columns (1)-(2) show results for the period of 2000 to 2006 and columns (3)-(4) show the results for the
period of 2007 to 2010. Columns (1) and (3) control for RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, Supply Elasticity, High Income Growth
Dummy, High POP Growth Dummy and state fixed effects. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total book value
on the quadratic form of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000. High Income Growth Dummy is an indicator for
MSAs with above median income growth rate during 1990 to 2000. High POP Growth Dummy is an indicator for MSAs with
above median population growth during 1990 to 2000. Columns (2) and (4) additionally control for quintile dummies of Supply
Elasticity interacted with RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. For brevity, coefficients on quintile dummies of Supply Elasticity are not
reported. Panel B shows the results only with large MSAs whose average population is above 750000. We use MSA population
in 2000 as a weight for all regression results. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. We use robust
standard errors. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: All MSAs Annual Home Price Appreciation
2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.002** -0.008** 0.003** 0.008**
(-2.24) (-2.39) (2.51) (2.24)
Supply Elasticity -0.006*** -0.007* 0.006*** -0.001
(-3.55) (-1.73) (3.05) (-0.37)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.019*** -0.016** 0.014** 0.011**
(-2.81) (-2.45) (2.31) (2.12)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.010 0.008 -0.028*** -0.028***
(1.53) (1.25) (-4.06) (-4.75)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (2/5) 0.004 -0.004
(1.49) (-1.08)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (3/5) 0.006** -0.004
(2.09) (-0.87)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (4/5) 0.007* -0.011**
(1.95) (-2.34)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (5/5) 0.008** -0.008*
(2.44) (-1.92)
Observations 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.921 0.926 0.890 0.899
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Large MSAs Annual Home Price Appreciation
2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.010* -0.032** 0.014*** 0.016
(-1.88) (-2.72) (3.35) (1.08)
Supply Elasticity -0.003 0.002 0.012 -0.009
(-0.27) (0.06) (1.32) (-0.28)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.0245 -0.035** 0.016* 0.017*
(-1.37) (-2.70) (1.73) (2.05)
High POP Growth Dummy -0.001 0.016 -0.021* -0.022
(-0.09) (1.00) (-1.74) (-1.02)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE x Supply Elasticity Dummy (2/5) 0.025 0.002
(1.32) (0.06)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE x Supply Elasticity Dummy (3/5) 0.010 0.004
(0.46) (0.18)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE x Supply Elasticity Dummy (4/5) 0.024* 0.001
(1.84) (0.03)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE x Supply Elasticity Dummy (5/5) 0.030 -0.032
(1.31) (-1.23)
Observations 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.960 0.985 0.966 0.972
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Explaining Sand States with RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
We report estimates of the relationship of Sand State Dummy on annual percentage changes in mortgage origination and home
price appreciation. Panel A shows the results with all MSAs. Columns (1)-(4) report the results on average Annual % Change
in Total Mortgage Origination where (1)-(2) are for the period of 2000 to 2006 and (3)-(4) are for the period of 2007 to 2010.
Columns (1) and (3) report the baseline regression with Sand State Dummy, Supply Elasticity, High Income Growth Dummy,
High POP Growth Dummy and the quintile dummies of Supply Elasticity. Sand State dummy equals to 1 for MSAs in Arizona,
California, Florida, or Nevada. High Income Growth Dummy is an indicator for MSAs with above median income growth
rate during 1990 to 2000. High POP Growth Dummy is an indicator for MSAs with above median population growth during
1990 to 2000. For brevity, the coefficients on Supply Elasticity and the quintile dummies of Supply Elasticity are not reported.
Columns (2) and (4) report the prediction results if RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is zero for all MSAs. We first regress average
Annual % Change in Total Mortgage Origination on Supply Elasticity, quintile dummies of Supply Elasticity, RESIDUAL
BOOK VALUE, the interactions of quintile dummies and RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, High Income Growth Dummy, High
POP Growth Dummy with state fixed effects. We compute the predicted value from this first-stage regression after setting
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE equal to zero for all MSAs. Then we use the predicted value as dependent variable for prediction
results. First-stage regression results on mortgage originations are reported in Appendix Table 2. We report the percentage
difference in baseline results and prediction results. Columns (5)-(8) report the results on average Annual % Change in Second
Home Mortgage Origination. Columns (9)-(12) report the results on average Annual Home Price Appreciation. First-stage
regression results on home price appreciation are reported in Table 5. Columns (13)-(14) report the results on Mortgage Default
Rate. For each MSA, Mortgage Default Rate is the ratio of the number of Notice Of Default from the RealtyTrac from 2007
to 2010 to the number of mortgage originations from HMDA from 2000 to 2006. First-stage regression results on mortgage
originations are reported in Appendix Table 3. Panel B shows the results only with large MSAs whose average population is
above 750000. We use MSA population in 2000 as a weight for all regression results. The table reports point estimates with
t-statistics in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: All MSAs
Annual % Change in Annual % Change in
Total Mortgage Origination Second Home Mortgage Origination
2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010 2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction
Sand State Dummy 0.076*** 0.050*** -0.085** -0.046 0.056*** 0.027 0.007 0.035
(4.99) (3.15) (-2.27) (-1.34) (2.84) (1.11) (0.22) (1.3)
Difference -34% 45% -51% 370%
High Income Growth Dummy -0.042** -0.037*** 0.065** 0.056* -0.048** -0.046** 0.020 0.014
(-2.37) (-2.58) (2.13) (1.87) (-1.97) (-1.96) (0.86) (0.55)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.045** 0.035*** -0.123*** -0.110*** 0.039 0.026 -0.084*** -0.076***
(2.47) (2.95) (-4.28) (-4.34) (1.19) (1.00) (-3.01) (-2.78)
Observations 277 277 277 277 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.409 0.467 0.338 0.328 0.086 0.273 0.107 0.218
Annual Home Price Appreciation Mortgage Default Rate
2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010 2007 - 2010
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Variables Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction
Sand State Dummy 0.060*** 0.053*** -0.075*** -0.067*** 0.071*** 0.060***
(6.74) (5.92) (-8.06) (-9.99) (4.86) (4.47)
Difference -11% 11% -15%
High Income Growth Dummy -0.021*** -0.019*** 0.007 0.005 -0.010 -0.007
(-2.90) (-2.61) (0.98) (0.99) (-0.91) (-0.72)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.014** 0.012** -0.022*** -0.019*** 0.013 0.009
(2.38) (2.43) (-3.04) (-3.85) (1.23) (0.94)
Observations 277 277 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.708 0.733 0.731 0.789 0.575 0.577
42
Table 7 Continues
Panel B: Large MSAs
Annual % Change in Annual % Change in
Total Mortgage Origination Second Home Mortgage Origination
2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010 2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction
Sand State Dummy 0.068*** -0.004 -0.063 0.025 0.059** 0.003 -0.004 0.058
(3.99) (-0.19) (-1.30) (0.48) (2.33) (0.12) (-0.10) (1.66)
Difference -105% 139% -95% 1648%
Supply Elasticity 0.034 0.047 0.021 0.012 0.104 0.116 0.056 0.048
(0.88) (1.28) (0.33) (0.19) (1.13) (1.34) (1.38) (0.97)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.056*** -0.061*** 0.061 0.053 -0.059* -0.065** 0.005 -0.009
(-2.82) (-3.29) (1.44) (1.05) (-1.89) (-2.11) (0.15) (-0.26)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.057** 0.072*** -0.130*** -0.139*** 0.064 0.083* -0.027 -0.032
(2.26) (2.90) (-2.78) (-2.95) (1.46) (1.95) (-0.68) (-0.79)
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.479 0.471 0.327 0.234 0.287 0.269 0.183 0.111
Home Price Appreciation Mortgage Default Rate
2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010 2007 - 2010
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Variables Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction Baseline Prediction
Sand State Dummy 0.052*** 0.021 -0.066*** -0.043*** 0.066*** 0.040***
(6.06) (1.66) (-6.47) (-4.34) (3.53) (3.05)
Difference -60% 35% -40%
Supply Elasticity 0.011 0.020 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.018
(0.74) (1.08) (1.50) (1.20) (0.90) (0.72)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.032*** -0.040*** 0.005 0.003 -0.011 -0.006
(-4.03) (-3.14) (0.51) (0.27) (-0.81) (-0.49)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.030** 0.041*** -0.020* -0.023** 0.011 0.012
(2.62) (2.92) (-1.87) (-2.27) (0.75) (0.82)
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.728 0.682 0.750 0.713 0.522 0.447
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Table 8: Summary Statistics
We report summary statistics of the Survey of Consumer Finance for 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010 waves. The sample
consists of households in MSAs with population greater than 750,000. HAVE INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE is an indicator
that the family owns investment real estate. HAVE DIRECTLY-HELD STOCKS is an indicator that the family directly owns
stock. % INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE is the share of a family’s assets invested in investment real estate. % DIRECTLY-
HELD STOCKS is the share a family’s assets invested directly in stock. MSA Unemployment Rate is unemployment rate from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. MSA Home Price Index is MSA-level home price index from FHFA. MSA Housing Affordability
Index is the Housing Affordability Index from the National Association of Realtors. Since the index is available only for 2009
to 2011, we backfilled the data using time-series average of available Housing Affordability Index. log HOUSE PRICE ZIP
CODE is a home price index at zip code level from Zillow. FAMILY SIZE is the number of people in each Primary Economic
Unit. log HOUSEHOLD INCOME is the log of household income. HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH is the household’s net worth.
UNATTACHED FEMALE is an indicator that the family is headed by an unattached woman. AGE, RACE, EDUCATION, and
FAMILY STRUCTURE are also reported. LWP stands for the “living with partner” in the FAMILY STRUCTURE variable.
Variables Obs Mean Std. Max Min
HAVE INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE 89956 0.13 0.34 1 0
HAVE VACATION HOME 89956 0.06 0.24 1 0
HAVE DIRECTLY-HELD STOCKS 89956 0.21 0.41 1 0
% INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE 89956 0.03 0.10 1 0
% VACATION HOME 89956 0.01 0.04 0.87 0
% DIRECTLY-HELD STOCKS 87700 0.02 0.08 1 0
MSA Unemployment Rate 89956 5.65 2.26 15.87 2.14
MSA Home Price Index 89956 162.67 53.67 323.15 100.75
MSA Housing Affordability Index 86411 119.75 57.82 383.40 51.17
log HOUSE PRICE ZIP CODE 58964 12.22 0.64 15.14 10.40
FAMILY SIZE 89956 2.44 1.42 13 1
log HOUSEHOLD INCOME 89956 10.87 1.13 19.64 0
HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH 89956 591580 4052609 4.80E+09 -2.74E+07
UNATTACHED FEMALE 89956 0.27 0.45 1 0
AGE
<35 89956 0.23 0.42 1 0
35 – 49 89956 0.33 0.47 1 0
50 – 64 89956 0.24 0.43 1 0
≥65 89956 0.19 0.40 1 0
RACE
White 89956 0.68 0.47 1 0
Black 89956 0.16 0.36 1 0
Hispanic 89956 0.10 0.31 1 0
Asian & Other 89956 0.05 0.21 1 0
EDUCATION
Less than High School 89956 0.13 0.34 1 0
High School or GED only 89956 0.28 0.45 1 0
Some college (or Associate’s), but no Bachelor’s 89956 0.25 0.43 1 0
Bachelor’s 89956 0.21 0.41 1 0
MA or MS(non-MBA), plus nursing degree 89956 0.07 0.26 1 0
Advanced (PhD, JD, MBA, MD) 89956 0.06 0.24 1 0
FAMILY STRUCTURE
Not Married/LWP+Children 89956 0.13 0.33 1 0
Not Married/LWP+no Children+Head(<55) 89956 0.16 0.37 1 0
Not Married/LWP+no Children+Head(≥55) 89956 0.13 0.34 1 0
Married/LWP+Children 89956 0.32 0.47 1 0
Married/LWP+no Children 89956 0.26 0.44 1 0
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Table 9: Distribution of Average FICO Score at Zip Code Level
The entries are measures of the distribution of average FICO scores of households aggregated to the zip code level. The sample
includes all zip codes in the US. The zip codes are sorted into quartiles based on average FICO score.
Mean Min Max
Lowest FICO Quartile 621 439 643
Second FICO Quartile 663 644 680
Third FICO Quartile 695 681 709
Highest FICO Quartile 724 710 822
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Table 10: Investment Real Estate Ownership, Directly-held Stocks Ownership
and RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
We report logit estimates of the relationship between demographic characteristics including RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and
the likelihood that a household owns investment real estate and stocks. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is an
indicator that the family owns investment real estate. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is an indicator that the
family directly owns stock. The independent variables include RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, the residual of log total book value
on the quadratic form of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000, log HOUSEHOLD INCOME, the usual income of the
family and log HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH, the wealth of family (not including real estate in columns (1) and (2) and not
including stock holdings in columns (3) and (4)). High FICO Zip Code is a dummy for the household living in a zip code in the
top quartile of the average FICO score distribution. UNATTACHED FEMALE is an indicator that the family is headed by an
unattached woman. Other Household Controls include age, race, and education-level of the head of the family, family structure,
and a linear and square term of the number of people in the family. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in
parentheses. All the standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
The average marginal effect is in brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables HAVE INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE HAVE DIRECTLY-HELD STOCK
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.120*** -0.078** 0.100*** 0.098***
(-4.34) (-2.37) (4.08) (2.75)
[-.012] [-.008] [.013] [.013]
High FICO Zip Code -0.285*** -0.220*** 0.192*** 0.176***
(-4.84) (-3.61) (4.34) (3.67)
log HOUSEHOLD INCOME 0.218*** 0.221*** 0.355*** 0.359***
(4.63) (5.51) (7.54) (7.54)
log HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH 0.582*** 0.589*** 0.430*** 0.432***
(22.82) (22.4) (19.37) (19.03)
UNATTACHED FEMALE -0.272*** -0.280*** -0.220*** -0.221***
(-2.59) (-2.69) (-3.28) (-3.26)
Age Age 35-49 0.298*** 0.298*** -0.229*** -0.222***
(3.24) (3.23) (-3.26) (-3.09)
Age 50-64 0.550*** 0.568*** -0.348*** -0.331***
(6.2) (6.31) (-5.44) (-5.05)
Age 65+ 0.518*** 0.530*** -0.098 -0.085
(4.89) (4.95) (-1.15) (-0.98)
Race Black 0.352*** 0.373*** -0.496*** -0.496***
(3.91) (3.96) (-6.09) (-6.18)
Hispanic 0.215** 0.206** -0.991*** -0.971***
(2.07) (1.98) (-8.77) (-8.52)
Asian and Other 0.126 0.164 0.081 0.089
(1.05) (1.34) (0.83) (0.86)
Education High School Degree -0.140 -0.152 0.468*** 0.475***
(-1.35) (-1.42) (3.80) (3.83)
Some College 0.015 -0.023 0.795*** 0.817***
(0.15) (-0.23) (5.93) (6.05)
Bachelors Degree -0.087 -0.098 1.169*** 1.191***
(-0.81) (-0.90) (8.92) (9.02)
MA or MS 0.001 -0.010 1.157*** 1.180***
(0.01) (-0.08) (7.82) (7.87)
Advanced Degree -0.218 -0.236 1.031*** 1.055***
(-1.76) (-1.93) (7.31) (7.38)
Other Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes — Yes —
Year × Census Division Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 89956 89956 89956 89956
46
Table 11: % Share of Investment Property, % Share of Directly-held Stocks
and RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
We report tobit estimates of the relationship between RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and the amount that a family owns of
investment real estate and stocks. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the share of a family’s assets invested in
investment real estate. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the share the family’s assets invested directly in stock.
The independent variables include include RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, the residual of log total book value on the quadratic
form of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000, log HOUSEHOLD INCOME, the usual income of the family and log
HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH, the wealth of family (not including real estate in columns (1) and (2) and not including stock
holdings in columns (3) and (4)). High FICO Zip Code is a dummy for the household living in a zip code in the top quartile
of the average FICO score distribution. UNATTACHED FEMALE is an indicator that the family is headed by an unattached
woman. Other Household Controls include age, race, and education-level of the head of the family, family structure, and a
linear and square term of the number of people in the family. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses.
All the standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables % INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE % DIRECTLY-HELD STOCKS
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.0088*** -0.0083*** 0.0068*** 0.0062***
(-4.89) (-4.64) (5.44) (4.84)
High FICO Zip Code -0.0298*** -0.0308*** 0.0161*** 0.0156***
(-19.87) (-20.00) (15.94) (15.44)
log HOUSEHOLD INCOME 0.0188*** 0.0181*** 0.0296*** 0.0295***
(17.41) (16.31) (19.73) (20.21)
log HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH 0.0472*** 0.0475*** 0.0113*** 0.0113***
(24.84) (25.54) (9.04) (9.11)
UNATTACHED FEMALE -0.0254*** -0.0252*** -0.0179*** -0.0183***
(-15.03) (-15.65) (-6.83) (-6.65)
Age Age 35-49 0.0196*** 0.0211*** -0.0211*** -0.0210***
(12.89) (12.41) (-12.71) (-12.73)
Age 50-64 0.0516*** 0.5370*** -0.0235*** -0.0228***
(14.21) (14.36) (-19.26) (-20.00)
Age 65+ 0.6710*** 0.0677*** 0.0301*** 0.0305***
(15.15) (15.25) (35.41) (31.84)
Race Black 0.0583*** 0.0593*** -0.0426*** -0.0421***
(20.9) (23.91) (-17.75) (-17.62)
Hispanic 0.0280*** 0.0265*** -0.0705*** -0.0716***
(13.59) (13.32) (-18.26) (-18.84)
Asian and Other 0.025*** 0.0273*** -0.0023 -0.0028
(7.62) (8.50) (-1.31) (-1.48)
Education High School Degree -0.0296*** -0.0306*** 0.0428*** 0.0421***
(-14.65) (-15.61) (11.60) (10.94)
Some College -0.0157*** -0.0154*** 0.0642*** 0.0647***
(-10.75) (-10.62) (14.86) (14.87)
Bachelors Degree -0.0202*** -0.0193*** 0.0891*** 0.0896***
(-8.11) (-8.04) (18.84) (18.78)
MA or MS -0.0119*** -0.0119*** 0.0867*** 0.0873***
(-5.43) (-5.59) (17.34) (16.76)
Advanced Degree -0.0441*** -0.0438*** 0.0810*** 0.0808***
(-16.39) (-16.65) (17.16) (16.83)
Other Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes — Yes —
Year × Census Division Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 89956 89956 89956 89956
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Table 12: The Difference in Investment Home Ownership Between High and
Low Credit Risk Households Within a MSA by RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE
We report estimates of the relationship of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on a family’s holdings of investment real estate, splitting
up the effect of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE for households living in low and high credit risk zip codes. The sample consists
of families who live in a zip code in the highest and lowest 25% of the credit risk distribution (measured by average FICO
scores). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is an indicator for whether the family owns investment real estate.
The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the share of investment real estate of a family’s assets. Columns (1) and (3)
replicate the results in Table 10 and 11 to show that main results are still valid in the subsample. The independent variables
are the same as in Table 10 except for a couple of differences. High FICO Zip Code × RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the
interaction of that indicator and RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. Year × MSA Effects are a full set of MSA by year dummy
interactions. Because of the inclusion of Year × MSA Effects, the coefficient on RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is not identified.
The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. All the standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. ***,
**, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HAVE INVESTMENT % INVESTMENT
Variables REAL ESTATE REAL ESTATE
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × High FICO Zip Code -0.0221*** -0.0051**
(-3.01) (-2.11)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.0099* — -0.0170 —
(-1.92) (-1.01)
High FICO Zip Code -0.0094 -0.0054 -0.0061 -0.0052
(-0.72) (-0.41) (-1.55) (-1.31)
log HOUSEHOLD INCOME 0.0421*** 0.0419*** 0.0051*** 0.0050***
(6.85) (6.77) (2.74) (2.71)
log HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH 0.0135*** 0.0138*** 0.0028*** 0.0029***
(10.47) (10.62) (7.16) (7.08)
UNATTACHED FEMALE -0.0241* -0.0237 -0.0058 -0.0057
(-1.66) (-1.63) (-1.38) (-1.36)
Other Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes — Yes —
Year × MSA Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 41845 41845 41845 41845
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Figure 1: RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE and Sand States
The figure shows the scatter plot of MSA log Total Income and MSA log Total Book Value with quadratic fitted line. Log Total
Book Value is the log of average total book value of firms headquartered in a MSA from 1996 to 2000 and log Total Income is
the log of average total income in a MSA from 1996 to 2000. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, which is the residual of log total
book value on the quadratic form of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000, is the orthogonal distance to the fitted
line. We report the names of MSAs in sand states (AZ, CA, FL, NV).
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Figure 2: Home Price Appreciation by Elasticity and by RESIDUAL BOOK
VALUE
The figure shows the time-series of average home price appreciation by the groups of elasticity and RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE.
We independently sorts MSAs into six groups: 3 groups of supply elasticity and 2 groups of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE.
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total book value on the quadratic form of log total income using years from
1996 to 2000. First column shows the graph using all MSAs and second column shows the graph using only large MSAs
with average population more than 750000. Blue solid line indicates low RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE group and red dash line
indicates high RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE group.
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Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE across the US
The figure shows the RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE variable for MSAs in the US. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of
log total book value on the quadratic form of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000.
 2.40 to  5.60
 1.58 to  2.40
 0.99 to  1.58
 0.60 to  0.99
 0.21 to  0.60
−0.03 to  0.21
−0.43 to −0.03
−0.99 to −0.43
−2.64 to −0.99
−9.41 to −2.64
NA
51
Figure 4: MSA-level Scatter Plot
The figure shows scatter plots of the MSA RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE with the MSA average investment real estate ownership
(HAVE INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE) or the MSA average % share of investment real estate in households’ asset (%
INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE). Panel A shows the scatter plot of investment real estate ownership. Panel B shows the
scatter plot of % share of investment real estate in households’ assets. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total
book value on the quadratic form of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000.
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Table A1: List of Large MSAs
We report the list of large MSAs with more than 750000 population on average during 2000-2010. MSAs are sorted and ranked
by RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total book value on the quadratic form of
log total income using years from 1996 to 2000. MSAs in sand states (AZ, CA, FL, NV) are reported in bold.
Code MSA name RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE Rank
36540 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 2.23 1
35620 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 1.62 2
14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 1.59 3
16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 1.45 4
40060 Richmond, VA 1.28 5
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 0.97 6
19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 0.86 7
25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 0.85 8
13820 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 0.70 9
32820 Memphis, TN-MS-AR 0.69 10
10900 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 0.68 11
26420 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 0.64 12
16980 Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 0.60 13
46140 Tulsa, OK 0.55 14
47900 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 0.47 15
27260 Jacksonville, FL 0.47 16
19740 Denver-Aurora, CO 0.44 17
39580 Raleigh-Cary, NC 0.42 18
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 0.39 19
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 0.38 20
18140 Columbus, OH 0.33 21
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 0.22 22
41620 Salt Lake City, UT 0.22 23
12940 Baton Rouge, LA 0.17 24
28140 Kansas City, MO-KS 0.14 25
33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 0.10 26
19820 Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 0.08 27
37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 0.08 28
34980 Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 0.05 29
49340 Worcester, MA 0.05 30
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 0.03 31
41700 San Antonio, TX 0.02 32
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 0.01 33
19380 Dayton, OH -0.04 34
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI -0.07 35
29820 Las Vegas-Paradise, NV -0.11 36
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH -0.13 37
26900 Indianapolis-Carmel, IN -0.13 38
35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA -0.14 39
38300 Pittsburgh, PA -0.19 40
41180 St. Louis, MO-IL -0.20 41
31100 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA -0.25 42
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD -0.28 43
40380 Rochester, NY -0.29 44
24340 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI -0.36 45
12420 Austin-Round Rock, TX -0.40 46
47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC -0.43 47
31140 Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN -0.45 48
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA -0.53 49
39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA -0.57 50
36420 Oklahoma City, OK -0.58 51
33100 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL -0.86 52
46060 Tucson, AZ -0.89 53
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ -0.89 54
15380 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY -0.94 55
12580 Baltimore-Towson, MD -1.03 56
35300 New Haven-Milford, CT -1.03 57
10740 Albuquerque, NM -1.06 58
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA -1.13 59
45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL -1.15 60
36740 Orlando-Kissimmee, FL -1.55 61
10580 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY -1.78 62
40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA -2.89 63
12540 Bakersfield, CA -3.01 64
23420 Fresno, CA -3.51 65
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Table A2: Mortgage Origination Interacted with Supply Elasticity
We report estimates of the relationship of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on annual % change in mortgage origination. Panel A
shows the results with all MSAs. Columns (1)-(2) report the results on average Annual % Change in Total Mortgage Origination.
Column (1) shows result for the period of 2000 to 2006 and column (2) shows the result for the period of 2007 to 2010. We
control for RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, Supply Elasticity, the quintile dummies of Supply Elasticity, High Income Growth
Dummy, High POP Growth Dummy and include state fixed effects. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total
book value on the quadratic form of log total income using years from 1996 to 2000. High Income Growth Dummy is an indicator
for MSAs with above median income growth rate during 1990 to 2000. High POP Growth Dummy is an indicator for MSAs
with above median population growth during 1990 to 2000. For brevity, coefficients on quintile dummies of Supply Elasticity
are not reported. Columns (3)-(4) report the results on average Annual % Change in Second Home Mortgage Origination.
Column (3) shows result for the period of 2000 to 2006 and column (4) shows the result for the period of 2007 to 2010. Panel
B shows the results only with large MSAs whose average population is above 750000. We use MSA population in 2000 as a
weight for all regression results. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. We use robust standard
errors. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: All MSAs Annual % Change in Total Annual % Change in Second
MTG Origination Home MTG Origination
2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010 2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.0293*** 0.0357** -0.0374* 0.0242*
(-2.888) (2.572) (-1.774) (1.741)
Supply Elasticity -0.00956 0.000142 -0.0173 0.0475
(-1.360) (0.0112) (-0.584) (1.036)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.0428*** 0.0457** -0.0346 -0.00308
(-3.992) (2.310) (-1.413) (-0.104)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.0559*** -0.0592*** -0.00261 -0.0350
(3.401) (-2.620) (-0.0498) (-1.321)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (2/5) 0.0240 -0.00952 0.0708 -0.00325
(1.470) (-0.625) (1.058) (-0.237)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (3/5) 0.0141 -0.0112 -0.0310 -0.00624
(1.197) (-0.728) (-0.486) (-0.417)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (4/5) 0.0306*** -0.0366** 0.0293 -0.0345*
(2.841) (-1.990) (1.409) (-1.816)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (5/5) 0.0173 -0.0326** -0.00682 -0.0352
(1.360) (-2.216) (-0.144) (-1.165)
Observations 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.780 0.765 0.336 0.484
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Large MSAs Annual % Change in Total Annual % Change in Second
MTG Origination Home MTG Origination
2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010 2000 - 2006 2007 - 2010
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.0589** 0.0595 -0.0429 0.0329
(-2.264) (1.536) (-1.299) (1.056)
Supply Elasticity 0.0315 -0.00839 0.0248 0.0593
(0.484) (-0.0984) (0.245) (1.047)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.0523* 0.0751*** -0.0848** 0.0210
(-2.078) (3.214) (-2.550) (0.771)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.0502 -0.0259 0.00498 0.0495
(1.200) (-0.441) (0.0936) (0.970)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (2/5) 0.0257 0.00455 0.0374 0.0149
(0.691) (0.0800) (0.777) (0.377)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (3/5) -0.00570 0.0218 -0.0386 0.0448
(-0.145) (0.315) (-0.771) (0.954)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (4/5) 0.0203 0.000406 0.00700 0.0237
(0.685) (0.00925) (0.180) (0.668)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (5/5) 0.0826 -0.101 0.0969 -0.126
(1.269) (-1.258) (0.988) (-1.718)
Observations 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.980 0.963 0.981 0.972
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A3: Mortgage Default Rate Interacted with Supply Elasticity
We report estimates of the relationship of RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE on mortgage default rate. For each MSA, Mortgage
Default Rate is the ratio of the number of Notice Of Default from 2007 to 2010 to the number of mortgage origination from
2000 to 2006. Column (1) shows the results with all MSAs. We control for RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE, Supply Elasticity,
the quintile dummies of Supply Elasticity, High Income Growth Dummy, High POP Growth Dummy and include state fixed
effects. RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE is the residual of log total book value on the quadratic form of log total income using years
from 1996 to 2000. High Income Growth Dummy is an indicator for MSAs with above median income growth rate during 1990
to 2000. High POP Growth Dummy is an indicator for MSAs with above median population growth during 1990 to 2000. For
brevity, coefficients on quintile dummies of Supply Elasticity are not reported. Column (2) shows the results only with large
MSAs whose average population is above 750000. We use MSA population in 2000 as a weight for all regression results. The
table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and
10% statistical significance.
Mortgage Default Rate 2007 - 2010
All MSAs Large MSAs
Variables (1) (2)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE -0.0117*** -0.0158
(-2.952) (-1.299)
Supply Elasticity -9.76e-05 0.000583
(-0.0410) (0.0205)
High Income Growth Dummy -0.0115*** -0.0135
(-2.683) (-1.624)
High POP Growth Dummy 0.0185*** 0.0130
(3.355) (0.555)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (2/5) 0.00738 -0.00716
(1.585) (-0.359)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (3/5) 0.00778* -0.0114
(1.682) (-0.429)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (4/5) 0.0110*** -0.00183
(2.654) (-0.127)
RESIDUAL BOOK VALUE × Elasticity Dummy (5/5) 0.0115*** 0.0376**
(2.839) (2.274)
Observations 277 65
R-squared 0.917 0.980
State FE Yes Yes
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